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"Plus 'il' change, plus 'il' reste le nzme:"
"PLUS 'IL' CHANGE, PLUS 'IL' RESTE
LE MIEME:" BARTLEBY'S LAWYER
AND THE COMMON LAW
By NATHAN M. GREENFIELD*
This article responds in part to Bryan Schwartz's "A Meditation on 'Bartleby'"
published in volume 22(3) of this Journal. The author here suggests that the Lawyer
narrator of Herman Melville's "Bartleby, the Scrivener" is not transformed by his
contact with Bartleby. Rather, the story exemplifies the Lawyer's unchanging reliance
on and approval of common-law contract theory in order to identify and deal with
societal problems.
A Reasonable Constitution
What though Reason forged your scheme?
'Twas Reason dreamed Utopia's dream:
'Tis dream to think reason can
Govern the reasoning creature, man.
- Herman Melville
I. INTRODUCTION
The effect the recalcitrant Bartleby has on his employer, the narrating
Lawyer of Herman Melville's 1853 story "Bartleby, the Scrivener,"'
continues to fascinate both literary critics and legal thinkers. For example,
Bryan Schwartz, whose "Meditation on 'Bartleby"' appeared in a recent
number of this Journal, turns to this "story of Wall Street" to illustrate
his point that while lawyers might never be able to escape the "forms
and conventions" that define the "middle kingdom"2 of the common
law, they can, nevertheless, become more sympathetic and humane
individuals. Indeed, he argues that because of his encounter with Bartleby,
the Lawyer goes from being a man who "refuse[s] to take into account
@ Copyright, 1986, Nathan M. Greenfield.
* Mr. Greenfield is a doctoral candidate in English Literature at McGill University who
specializes in the literary response to law in Antebellum America.
I H. Melville, "Bartleby, the Scrivener" in Billy Budd and Other Tales (New York: The American
Library, 1961) at 103.
2 B. Schwartz, "A Meditation on Bartleby" (1984) 22 Osgoode Hall LJ. 441 at 469.
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the wholeness of human beings" 3 to one who feels, with Bartleby,
"sadness" 4 at the tragedy of human existence.5
Schwartz's interpretation of "Bartleby" admits a great debt to Leo
Marx's article "Melville's Parable of the Walls." 6 He follows Marx in
seeing Bartleby as an agent who transforms the Lawyer into a more
humane person. In this reading it is assumed that once Bartleby makes
the Lawyer "aware of the pain in the lives of his fellow human beings,"
he becomes a man of "deeply felt and spontaneous sympathy." 7 From
being a man who was devoted to the method and prudence of contract
and property law, and who, by his own admission, worshipped Mammon's
emissary in the person of John Jacob Astor, the Lawyer changes. When
he learns that people like Bartleby live lonely lives and that, propertied
or not, all men die lonely deaths, the Lawyer becomes a man of "fraternal
melancholy" who feels "sadness" at the vicissitudes of human existence. 8
Although he does not cite these words, Schwartz's general approval of
Marx's article indicates agreement that the most important aspect of
this story is that dealing with Bartleby has "gradually br[ought] out the
best in this complacent American." 9
While perhaps the best known interpretations of this difficult story,
Marx's and Schwartz's readings are not the only ways to understand
the outcome of the dialectic that exists between the nay-saying Bartleby
and he who begins as a "man of distinctly limited perception."1o Kingsley
Widmer and William Bysshe Stein have advanced a different interpre-
tation, arguing that the Lawyer is "incapable of a moral regeneration."'I
Far from being transformed by what Schwartz sees as the Lawyer's glimpse
3 Ibid at 469-70.
4 Ibid at 456.
5 Let me state clearly that my discussion of Schwartz's article is mainly concerned with his
reading of "Bartleby." I will not deal with his discussion of "semantic pluralism" or with the aesthetic
theories that underlie his conception of "great literature" and its qualities. Further, except for a
few comments in my conclusion, I will not address Schwartz's argument that if only common
law lawyers were more like Bartleby's employer they would be more humane and the common
law would be reformed. See Schwartz, supra, note 2 at 441, 469-72.
6 L. Marx, "Melville's Parable of the Walls" in Thomas Inge, ed., Bartleby The Inscnttable:
A Collection of Commentary on Herman Melville's Tale "Bartleby, The Scrivener" (Connecticut: Archon
Books, 1979) 84. Schwartz claims (supra, note 2 at 454, 455) that Marx's essay is "brilliant"
and later that it is "valuable."
According to Schwartz the major difference between his interpretation of "Bartleby" and Marx's
is that he takes into account that this story is infused with Melville's preoccupation with "death"
(see Schwartz, supra, note 2 at 455). As we will see below, while it is true that the Lawyer is
conscious of "death," that alone is not enough to redeem or even transform him.
7 Ibid at 104.
8 See Melville, supra, note 1 at 120; Schwartz, supra, note 2 at 457.
9 See Marx, supra, note 6 at 96; Schwartz, supra, note 2 at 460-61.
10 Ibid at 86.
11 W.B. Stein, "Bartleby: The Christian Conscience" in Howard Vincent, ed., Melville Annual
1965 Symposium: Bartleby the Scrivener (Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1966) at 104.
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into Bartleby's private hell of complete disbelief, Widmer states that,
from first to last, the Lawyer believes in the power of the "benevolent
rationalism" of nineteenth-century American business law.12 While it
might be true that thinking about Bartleby and his fate introduces the
Lawyer to "unfortunate circumstances and depressing knowledge,"
Widmer sees his final statement "Ah, Bartleby! Ah, humanity!"' 3 as only
the "sentimental gesture" of a "rationalizing" mind that "fail[s] to
understand Bartleby." 14 Stein's argument that the Lawyer remains un-
changed by his encounter with Bartleby turns on his analysis of the
Lawyer's use of biblical allusions. He shows that each time the Lawyer
alludes to the Bible his interpretation reveals an "utter perversion of
the basic principles of Christianity."15 Accordingly, Stein's analysis cuts
to the very heart of both Marx's claim that the Lawyer is somehow
"better[ed]" by his encounter with Bartleby and Schwartz's (somewhat
weaker) claim that one result of having dealt with Bartleby is that the
Lawyer learns to "lament[] the failure of human beings to reach each
other emotionally."16
The analysis presented here aligns itself with this second under-
standing of Melville's lawyer and includes an extended examination of
this character from a legal point of view. An examination of whether
the dialectical tension generated by Bartleby's self-proclaimed difference
actually does force the Lawyer to abandon the "forms and conventions"
of common, or more specifically, contract law, indicates that the Lawyer
never repudiates the ways, means, or rationale of the common law and
its assumptions about how society should be organized. For, although
there are a few moments in which the enigmatic Bartleby does shake
the Lawyer's faith in common-law assumptions and that might be said
to have the potential to change or 'better' this counsellor, none of these
moments actually does. No matter what perturbations might exist in the
middle of any particular episode, at the end of it, and at the end of
the story, the Lawyer remains faithful to the methods of the elegant
science produced by men such as John Marshall, James Kent, Joseph
Story, and Melville's own father-in-law, Massachusetts Chief Justice
Lemuel Shaw.
This analysis does not provide a discussion of the many intriguing
aspects of "Bartleby" about which Ann Douglas and Brooks Thomas
12 K Widmer, The Ways of Nihilism Melville's Shorter Works (San Diego, California: California
State Colleges, 1970) 119.
13 See Melville, supra, note I at 140.
14 See Widmer, supra, note 12 at 119.
15 See Stein, supra, note I1 at 108.
16 See Schwartz, supra, note 2 at 462.
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have recently written.17 Neither is a complete analysis presented here
of how, in his many works, Melville depicts the common law of contract.
Suffice it to say that in the vast majority of his works, Melville depicts
the person who has signed a contract or documents such as Ships Articles
as no longer having the same rights and privileges as the contractor
or the captain, respectively. We need only think of the way that other
of Melville's characters, including Wellingbourough Redbum, White
Jacket, and Ishmael must submit to the most petty commands in order
to understand what would be found by extending this study to a greater
number of texts.' 8 This article is limited to a careful delineation of the
unchanging contours of this famous nineteenth-century lawyer because,
only by showing how the traditional reading adopted by Schwartz is
incorrect, can we begin to appreciate what it was that Melville wanted
to depict about the socially powerful profession.
Although most discussions of "Bartleby" simply 'begin at the
beginning' of the text, "Bartleby," in fact, begins with a retrospective
prologue that tells us what the Lawyer is like in his old age. Accordingly,
this discussion is divided into three parts chronologically, each covering
different periods of the Lawyer's life. The first part covers the longest
period. It begins with an examination of what the Lawyer's ideology
and assumptions were before he met Bartleby, when he "advertiz[ed]"
for "additional help."' 9 This section then goes on to discuss the Lawyer's
attitude toward Bartleby through their contractual relationship and up
until the Lawyer leaves Bartleby to his fate in the deserted office. The
second section deals with the Lawyer's response to Bartleby's impri-
sonment in New York's Tombs, the scrivener's lonely death, and, most
importantly, the "Sequel," which contains the Lawyer's later speculations
on Bartleby's life and the rumour he heard about the scrivener's history.20
17 A. Douglas, The Feminization of American Culture (New York: Knopf, 1977); B. Thomas,
"The Legal Fictions of Herman Melville and Lemuel Shaw" (1984) XI Critical Inquiry at 21. For
example, I do not deal directly with Thomas' insight that Melville structured this story in such
a way as to have Bartleby's silence constitute a challenge to the epistemological structure of the
common law. Nor is this a limited study designed to add anything to Douglas' point that Melville
was one of the first American writers to abandon the absorbing practices of sentimental fiction
and to create a "modem epistemology" vis-a-vis the reader. However, my findings can easily be
fit into her discussion insofar as they reveal how the structure of this tale forces the reader to
do a great deal of work by making him or her question, and then finally reject, the sincerity
of the Lawyer's sentiment.
18 The list of Melville's protagonists who signed contracts or other documents that placed
them at the mercy of an arbitrary power is a long one. I will only point out that Toby in Typee:
A Romance of the South Seas (London: J. Cape, 1923), White Jacket in White-Jacket or the World
in a Man-of-War (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), Redburn in Redburn (London:
J. Cape, 1937) and Ishmael in Moby-Dick or The Whale (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1981) all signed either the Ships Articles or the Articles of War and thereby relinquished all control
over their own individual wills and the right to decide on what to expend their labour. Other
works which specifically refer to contractual relations are "A Paradise of Bachelors: A Tartrus
of Maids" and Billy Budd. (See Melville, supra, note I at 7.
19 See Melville, supra, note I at 110.
20 Ibid at 140.
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The third part returns to the prologue, and demonstrates that even in
his old age the Lawyer remains unaffected by the events he recounts.
II. BARTLEBY CONTRA THE EXPECTATIONS OF CONTRACT
LAW
To understand fully why the Lawyer acts toward Bartleby as he
does, it is necessary to begin with an examination of the assumptions
the Lawyer as an employer makes about his future employee when he
makes a public offer of contract. As conceived by early nineteenth-century
political economists and jurists such as Story and Shaw, contract law
was that branch of 'legal science' that described and, more importantly,
prescribed the interactions of discrete, profit-maximizing individuals in
a market society.2t The most important axiom of this 'private law' was
that every party to contract was 'rational' in the Lockean or Blackstonian
sense of the term.22 Due to the ideological assumptions that lay at the
heart of the American Revolution and the Federal Constitution, Americans
did not believe that 'reason' was limited only to those who had enough
fungible property to engage in commerce.23 Accordingly, they considered
all those who were enfranchised to be capable of the "wilful" behaviour
C.B. MacPherson has dubbed "possessive individualism" and thus of being
able to engage in day-labour contracts.24 While in eighteenth-century
21 My discussions of Justice Shaw's ideology and his understanding of "legal science" rests
upon the work of L.W. Levy, The Law of the Commonwealth and ChiefJustice Shaw (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1957); M. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1977) and L.M. Friedman and J. Ladinsky, "Social Change and the
Law of Industrial Accidents" in L.M. Friedman and H.N. Scheiber, eds., American Law and
Constitutional Order Historical Perspectives (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978) at 269.
22 Although a full discussion of John Locke's and Sir William Blackstone's definition of'reason'
is beyond the scope of this paper, it is worth noting that their notion of 'reason' had nothing to
do with the belief that certain men were incapable of logical inferences or of instrumental notions.
Rather, when they claimed that certain men were 'rational', they were saying that these men were
capable of partaking in specific types of social interaction, such as commerce. As C.B. MacPherson
puts it in his The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1962) at 255, Locke believed that once society had emerged from the "state of nature,"
a bifurcation occurred whereby "full rationality went the way of appropriating rather than with
laboring.'
For a discussion of how Locke's ideas formed the basis of Blackstone's assumptions about
both man and history, see D. Boorstin, The Mysterious Science of the Law, An Essay on Blackstone's
Commentaries (Gloucester, Mass.: P. Smith, 1973).
23 For a complete discussion of the changes in political assumptions brought about by the
American Revolution and the ratification of the Federal Constitution see: B. Bailyn, The Ideological
Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1967);
G.S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (Chapel Hill: Published for the
Institute of Early American History and Culture at Willamsburg, 1967); H.W. Jones, Political
Separation and Legal Continuity (Atlanta: American Bar Association, 1986); D.R. Nolan, "Sir William
Blackstone and the New American Republic: A Study of Intellectual Impact" (1976) 51 N.Y.U.L.
Rev. at 731.
24 See MacPherson, supra, note 22 at 194-261. For a complete discussion of how nineteenth-
century American common law developed a different definition of 'willful behaviour' from that
which had existed in the eighteenth century, see Horwitz, supra, note 21 at 1-31, 160-210.
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England the criterion of independent 'reason' was having enough property
to avoid the temptation of selling one's vote, American workers dem-
onstrated 'reason' by their willingness to consider their labour as a
commodity subject to the laws and limits of contract.25 Thus, in the eyes
of Shaw, Story, or Marshall, all enfranchised men were "wilful" enough
to sign contracts that could be enforced.
Although the Lawyer tells us nothing about the advertisement, we
can assume that it described the position and stated that he would pay
"the usual rate of four cents a folio."26 The second stage of contract
formation, 'consideration', begins when Bartleby answers the public offer.
Again, the Lawyer tells us little: "After a few words touching his
qualifications, I engaged him."27 Yet, what he tells us is enough to indicate
that there was a 'meeting of the minds' in the sense that two discrete
individuals had reached an agreement to exchange their property in what
formally appears to be a mutually beneficial exchange. 28
Until the Lawyer engaged him, Bartleby had the same rights and
independent status as the Lawyer himself. When engaged in what legal
scholars sometimes refer to as 'the dance of wills', Bartleby was theo-
retically free to object to any specific term and even withdraw from
this incipient relationship.29 Unlike the medieval serf, the slave, or an
apprentice such as Ginger Nut, in the eyes of the law, Bartleby is a
'free' actor until he signals that he has, without duress from the Lawyer,
accepted the offer to exchange his only 'property', labour, for the Lawyer's
commodity, money. Only after the contract is concluded is the Lawyer
entitled to have a "natural expectancy" that any "request made according
to common usage and common sense" will receive "instant compliance." 30
25 For a discussion of how, according to contract law, a worker was expected to conceive
of himself, see ibid at 160-2 10.
26 See Melville, supra, note 1 at 117.
27 Ibid at 110.
28 For a discussion of the concepts of a "meeting of the minds" and the "will theory" of
law, see Horwitz, supra, note 21 at 160-210.
29 For a discussion of what contract law considers to be a "free" promise, see . Swan and
BJ. Reiter, Contracts: Cases Notes and Materials, 3d ed. (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 1985)
at 6-26 and 6-43.
30 See Melville, supra, note 1 at 110.
In Max Weber's Economy and Society, edited by G. Roth and C. Wittich, Vol. II (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1968) at 729-30 the following point is made:
The possibility of entering with others into contractual relations the content of which is
entirely determined by individual agreement ... has been immensely extended in modem
law, at least in the spheres of exchange of goods and of personal work and services. However,
the extent to which this trend has brought about an actual increase of the individual's freedom
to shape the conditions of his own life or the extent to which, on the contrary, life has
become more stereotyped in spite, or perhaps, just because of this trend, cannot be determined
simply by studying the development of formal legal institutions.... The formal right of
a worker to enter into any contract whatsoever with any employer whatsoever does not
in practice represent for the employment seeker even the slightest freedom in the determination
of his own conditions of work, and it does not guarantee him any influence on this process.
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In contrast to the eighteenth-century model of the 'exchange contract',
the nineteenth-century 'day-labour' contract fundamentally altered the
ontological status of one of its parties.31 The 'exchange contract' was
an instrument that allowed the transfer of goods between those with
property and, as such, was a means of extending their respective 'reason'
throughout the market. The 'day-labour' contract, on the other hand,
deprived workers of the right to exercise their 'will' for the duration
of the contract. This is because what the contracted worker exchanged
was not a true commodity: it could not be stored or mobilized. Rather,
labour is "only another name for a human activity which goes with life
itself."32 Labour only comes into existence as such when an "activity
[is] detached from the rest of life" and subjected to an authority other
than that of the individual himself.33 In other words, workers have, by
the logic of contract law, freely assented to having another's 'will' replace
their own determination of how and on what they expend their life activity.
Although the common law of contract effectively stripped workers
of their status as the contractor's ontological equal, it did not suddenly
view them as unreasonable or non-rational. Rather, it precisely defines
what constitutes the 'reason' of employees: the fulfillment of their promises
to carry out appropriate commands. To see this we need only examine
the Lawyer's attitude toward Turkey and Nippers. In contrast to the critics,
who are nearly unanimous in considering these workers "markedly
irrational" or even insane, the Lawyer himself never impugns their
'reason'. 34 Unlike Bartleby, whose refrain "I would prefer not to"3
indicates that the alchemy of common law has failed to transform his
'will', Turkey and Nippers never - even at their most obstreperous -
challenge the Lawyer's expectation that his 'will' is theirs.
It rather means, at least primarily, that the more powerful party in the market, i.e., normally
the employer, has the possibility to set the terms, to offer the job "take it or leave it,"
and, given the normally more pressing economic need of the worker, to impose his terms
upon him. The result of contractual freedom, then, is in the first place the opening of the
opportunity to use, by the clever utilization of property ownership in the market, these resources
without legal restraints as a means for the achievement of power over others.
31 For a discussion of the differences between the 'exchange contract' and the 'day-labour
contract', see Horwitz, supra, note 21 at 160-210.
32 K. Polanyi, The Great Transformation, The Political & Economic Origins of Our Tune (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1957) at 72.
33 Ibid
34 Rather than following the traditional view of the other scriveners, shared here by Widmer
(supra, note 12 at 108), I believe that it is more profitable to view them as products of contractual
logic. The most important point, therefore, is not the possible theory that their paroxysms might
mean that they too have an incipient "[will] to prefer not to" but the reality that they always
support the Lawyer. I should repeat that although he may consider them odd, and at times describes
them as "dependent" or as having "diseased ambition" (see Melville, supra, note 1 at 107-8) he
never states that they are outside the bounds of 'reason'. Indeed, as I show later, he turns to them
at the moment of crises.
35 See Melville, supra, note 1 at 113.
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Indeed, when Bartleby crosses his Rubicon, the Lawyer tells us that
he does so alone. Far from siding with him, the other contracted workers
remain loyal to the Lawyer and confirm to him that, no matter what,
"all the justice and all the reason" 36 remain on the side of contractual
order. The Lawyer indicates by his statement that if Nippers "wanted
anything, it was to be rid of a scrivener's table altogether,"37 an awareness
that his employees might have thoughts challenging the established order.
However, what is important to the Lawyer is the fact that Nippers never
acts upon his own desires. Rather than concerning himself with the
possibilities that his employees might act according to their own volition,
the Lawyer assumes that a 'reasonable' person who has entered a contract
will discipline himself or herself and thus remain within the law. Contract
law assures employers that "by virtue of habituation a command will
receive prompt and automatic obedience in stereotyped forms." 38
It is on the third day of his employ that Bartleby first announces,
"I would prefer not to."39 The Lawyer's immediate reaction of "perfect
silence" is instructive.40 By telling us that his "faculties" were "stunned,"
he reveals that he cannot imagine a state of affairs where workers'
preferences matter.41 Under the regime of contract law, such extra-
contractual and non-rational possibilities are irrelevant. "Rallying" 42 from
the shock, he makes two speculative statements that could explain this
jarring event and still keep his assumptions intact. Either Bartleby
misunderstood his request because it was not made clearly enough, or
perhaps the Lawyer's ears "deceived" him.4 3
After Bartleby replies in the same way to the renewed request, the
lawyer now makes clear that the problem lies entirely with Bartleby's
deviation from 'reason'. "Are you moon-struck?" 44 he asks, thus indicating
that he believes that this outrage can be explained only by lunacy, by
madness. The Lawyer's suggestion that Bartleby might be mad is, at
this point, based solely on the scrivener's refusal to follow commands
in a stereotyped way. At this point, it is not known that, unlike Turkey
and Nippers, Bartleby is full of oddities that prevent him from fulfilling
his promise to work on command. Thus, as far as the Lawyer is concerned,
madness is not a clinical condition deduced from patterns of behaviour;
36 Ibid
37 Ibid at 107, 112.
38 See Weber, supra, note 30, vol. I at 53.





44 Ibid The Oxford English Dictionary defines "moonstruck" as: "Affective in mind or deranged
in conduct.., a distracted or dazed condition apparently due to some mental obsession."
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rather, it is directly linked to an employee's willingness or, in this case,
unwillingness, to carry out a reasonable and contractually sanctioned
request45
This pattern is repeated a few days later when Bartleby not only
refuses to copy, but, more significantly, declines to take his assigned
place behind the Lawyer in the "seated column of clerks."46 Having been
45 For a full discussion on how mid-nineteenth century society tended to equate madness
and an inability to function in a market society see: D. Rothman, The Discovery of the Asylum"
Social Order and Disorder in the New Republic, 1st ed. (Toronto: Little Brown, 1976).
46 While a full discussion of the Lawyer's understanding of history (and how it differs from
Melville's own philosophy of history) is beyond the scope of this study, it is worth pausing at
the Lawyer's use of the word "column" to observe an aspect of the narrator's mind that has gone
unnoticed. I am referring to the fact that each of the five or six historical allusions which are
directly attributable to the narrator imply, if not a physically violent, then at least a hierarchical
domination of the individual by an external rational order. For example, it is no surprise that the
Lawyer would have a "plaster of Paris bust of Cicero" (112) for, as Robert A. Ferguson (Law
and Letters in American Culture, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984) tells us, because
of Cicero's devotion both to democracy and law, he was the role model for early American lawyers.
Yet, we do not hear of the statue on the tour of the office which begins the story. Instead, the
Lawyer first mentions his regard for Cicero after Bartleby asserts his own "will" and rejects the
assumptions of contract law. It is almost as if the Lawyer alludes to Cicero because he symbolizes
the entire history of forensic logic which Bartleby now puts in doubt. Rather than suggesting an
interest in Cicero's attempt to preserve Roman democracy, it seems to me that the Lawyer alludes
to this greatest of Roman lawyers in order to reassert the authority of a legal system which, since
Roman times, has recognized the validity of contractual obligations. In a word, he knows that
to accept Bartleby's assertion of the right of self-determination would be equivalent not only to
throwing the statue out, but, more importantly, to destroying an authority that has been sanctified
by almost two thousand years of legal science. Thus, what history offers this Lawyer is a justification
for the status quo.
Most of the historical allusions in "Bartleby" are of a military variety. Not only is there the
above use of the word "columns" (which is most obviously not connected to the word's architectural
meaning), but, there are the references to Marius' destruction of Carthage and the "deserted city
of Petra." Taken as a group these allusions tell us that what the Lawyer thinks is important in
history is the establishment of military domination. Unlike some thinkers, such as Melville himself,
the Lawyer does not develop from this fact a critique of history and those institutions which rely
on it for their legitimacy. [An idea of Melville's attitude can be grasped in the following anonymous
lament found in Mardi and a Voyage Thether, ed. by Harrison Hayford, Herschel Panter, G. Thomas
Tanselle (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970) at 529:
Students of history are horror-struck at the massacres of old; but in the shambles, men
are being murdered to-day. Could time be reversed, and the future change places with the
past, the past would cry out against us, and our future, fully as loudly, as we against the
ages foregone. All the Ages are his children, calling each other names.
Instead of criticising the violence which mars the past, the Lawyer wants to subject his workers
to the same type of discipline which is found in troop movements on a drill field, or better, in
columns of troops which march in perfect order under Roman generals like Marius.
The last historical allusion that I will mention is that which reflects the Men's House of Detention
in lower Manhattan. Now, while it is true the so-called Tombs are reminiscent of ancient architecture,
the Lawyer's allusion to ancient Egypt is another illustration of his belief that the only important
aspects of history are those which bespeak the domination of man by organized rational power.
Instead of correctly identifying this massive structure as a species of Greek Revival, and hence
implying, to some degree at least, the concept of democracy which was so dear to the Neo-classical
Americans of his time, the Lawyer tells us that his understanding of ancient history centers on
the despotism of a Pharaoh. It should also not go unnoticed that the oldest known contract, the
Rosetta Stone, was found in Egypt by Napoleon's troops. Thus, the Lawyer tells us that at the
foundation of his thought lies, not democratic beliefs (though he undoubtedly repeats such beliefs
within the rhetoric of his legal discourse) but a fascination with despotism and hierarchy.
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extraordinarily successful at putting the earlier incident behind him, the
Lawyer is again nonplussed: "For a few moments I was turned into
a pillar of salt."47 After recovering, the Lawyer attempts to reason with
Bartleby. Although he does not tell us much about their conversation,
it is probable that he tried to get Bartleby to agree to fulfill his promise
to perform his stipulated duties. The Lawyer's appeal to "common usage"
and "common sense"48 (terms that are familiar from the decisions of
men like Justice Shaw) fails to convince Bartleby that it is his duty to
comply with his contractor's 'will'.
Bartleby's reason for rejecting the Lawyer's request will not be
speculated on here.49 Of interest is the way the Lawyer characterizes
Bartleby's recalcitrance: he calls it "unprecedented and violently unreason-
able."50 Because of its legal connotations, the first of these terms is the
more interesting. By invoking the doctrine of precedent or stare decis,
the Lawyer reveals his conception of Bartleby's contention that although
the scrivener had entered a 'day-labour' contract, he still retained his
own desires and still claimed the right to control his own body and its
activities. As Daniel Boorstin has shown in his book on Sir William
Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, the common law
viewed any argument that could not be deduced from either precedent
or a pattern of judgments as lacking reason and common sense and,
therefore, devoid of legal force.51 It followed that anyone who would
make such an argument was outside the 'common sense' of humanity.
Given the logic of common law, any such claim would necessarily be
rejected by the appropriate court. To reinforce the Lawyer's "own plainest
47 See Melville, supra, note 1 at 113.
48 For references to how the terms "common sense" and "common usage" were used in
the judicial language of the timesee Horwitz, supra, note 21 at 1-31.
49 As can be seen from a glance at both Marx's and Schwartz's articles, there is a great
tradition in which critics try to explain the why of Bartleby's refusal. Where Marx sees a Melvillian
version of Thoreau, Schwartz sees a person who has become lost in the knowledge that all beings
must die, and that it basically does not matter what one does. The problem with these attempts
to fill in the missing piece is that while it might be intellectually satisfying to "know" what goes
on behind the scrivener's blank eyes, Melville has specifically prevented us from having access
to Bartleby's reason or, perhaps, lack thereof. It simply does not matter why Bartleby does or
does not do what he has contracted to perform. Instead, the important issue is how the Lawyer
responds to that which the scrivener does.
In answer to those who would still argue that we must somehow fill in the gaps left by a
major character such as Bartleby, I could do no better than to direct them to Thomas' article
"The Legal Fictions of Herman Melville and Lemuel Shaw" (supra, note 17). Thomas argues that
Melville created a silent character because he was trying to depict those who are silenced by the
legal and economic system. Thus, the question is not why are they silent, but who keeps them
silent or, in our study, what are those actions which the law recognizes as 'reasonable'.
50 See Melville, supra, note 1 at 113.
51 For a discussion of how Common Sense philosophy influenced Blackstone's conception
of both law and history, see Boorstin, supra, note 22.
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faith" 2 in the universal applicability of common law, the Lawyer
establishes a court of Bartleby's peers to consider the latter's plea.
The court that refuses to endorse Bartleby's claims is made up of
Turkey, Nippers, and Ginger Nut. It is important that before he turns
to them, the Lawyer is careful to characterize them in terms that conform
to the Lockean notion of a judge. Not only are they "disinterested
persons," 53 but because of their presence in the world of business they
can be assumed to understand the solemn system of contract that Bartleby
throws into question. Their unanimous support, which goes so far as
an offer to do battle with he who shirks his "business," 54 reinforces the
Lawyer's faith in the order of common law. For him, the other employees'
unanimity proves that it is Bartleby who deviates from 'common sense',
the fount of 'justice' and 'reason'. While one could argue that in this
sequence there was a moment when the lawyer might have been on
the verge of an understanding of non-contractual human relations, it
comes to naught. At the end of this sequence the Lawyer hears his own
earlier assessment of Bartleby issue forth from the mouth of his apprentice:
"I think, sir, that he's a little luny."55 The court of 'common sense' rules
against Bartleby's claim and the Lawyer remains committed to classical
liberal ideology.
In arguing that the dialectic between the Lawyer and Bartleby does
not significantly alter the former's Weltanschauung, or conception of the
world, the most highly charged incident that occurs during the contractual
relationship must be examined. In this incident, the Lawyer detours from
his way to Trinity Church and discovers that Bartleby had been "keeping
bachelor's hall" in his office.56
Upon realizing that his contracted worker lives in "great" poverty
and "horrible" solitude, the Lawyer tells us that he experienced, "for
the first time" in his life "a fraternal melancholy." 57 He realized that
there existed between them a "bond of a common humanity."5 8 This
"bond" has nothing to do with the previous contractual use of the term.
Here it implies a more humane relationship than that envisaged by contract
law. Instead of trumpeting liberal notions of discrete individuals who
are connected only by market relations, the Lawyer paraphrases John
52 See Melville, supra, note 1 at 113.
53 Ibid at 113.
54 Ibid at 114.
55 /bid
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Donne. If Bartleby is "miserable" and "friendless," 59 then so is he: "No
Man is an Island."
The most striking effect that this "fraternal melancholy" has on
the Lawyer is evidenced by the series of images that appear to extend
his new-found empathy to all humanity at all times. For a man who
is "little given to poetic enthusiasm," 60 we find allusions that are not
unlike the famous expansive movement Henry David Thoreau sketches
in the last chapter of Walden.61 However, where Thoreau tied the world
together by mingling ice cubes from Walden Pond with the waters of
the Ganges, the Lawyer's imagination concentrates on humanity's place
in its own structures. He moves in quick succession from the "bachelor's
hall" (which recalls the Inns of Court where English lawyers trained),
to the "deserted [city of] Petra"; from sounds of "industry and life" to
"Marius brooding among the ruins of Carthage"; from the "sons of Adam"
to the "bright silks and sparkling faces ... sailing down the Mississippi
of Broadway" and, finally, to the prophetic vision of the "scrivener's
pale form... laid out, among uncaring strangers in its shivering winding
sheet."62
Yet after the Lawyer's poetic flourish ends, two of his statements
indicate his real beliefs. Although both statements follow the Lawyer's
reverie in time, only one of them does so textually. The other, which
occurs inside the sequence of images, can best be understood as the
narrating Lawyer's own commentary on these allusions.
The former statement, although later in the text, is first in story
time. The Lawyer's "special thoughts" end when he is "suddenly ...
attracted by Bartleby's closed desk." 63 The desk, or to be more precise,
the possibility of using the key to open it, reminds the Lawyer of the
regime of contractual rights. From that point on he returns to his earlier
self. In a few sentences he goes from the suggestive line, "Presentiments
of strange discoveries hovered round me,"64 and the poetic image of
Bartleby's end, to legalistic prose that justifies opening the desk: "I will
mean no mischief, seek the gratification of no heartless curiosity ...
besides, the desk is mine, and its contents, too."65 There follows a mundane
59 bid See John Donne, "Devotions Upon Emergent Occasions: Seventeenth Meditation" in
John Hayward, ed., John Donne: Complete Poetry and Selected Prose (London: The Nonesuch Press,
1955) at 538.
60 Ibid at 104.
61 H.D. Thoreau, Walden (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971).
62 See Melville, supra, note 1 at 120.
63 Ibid at 120.
64 Ibid
65 Ibid
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list of what was in the desk, a list noticeably lacking in any poetic
speculation.
From here the pattern is very similar to what happens after Turkey
and Nippers buttress the Lawyer's faltering mind. Recalled to the
assumptions of common law, the Lawyer quickly distances himself from
Bartleby and from his momentary holistic view of the world. Although
he recounts how Bartleby did not engage in everyday activities, such
as walking or reading newspapers, the Lawyer draws no suggestive
inference. Rather than being insightful and sympathetic as many critics
believe, his description of Bartleby's only action - his "looking out"
his window at the "dead brick wall" 66 - as being a "dead-wall reverie[]" 67
is descriptive if not a little sardonic. Once again, the Lawyer concludes
that Bartleby is clinically deficient. He assumes that the scrivener suffers
from an "excessive and organic ill."68 He is "the victim of [an] innate
and incurable disorder" of the "soul." 69 In a word, Bartleby is incapable
of fulfilling the 'rational' duties of contract law. One might even go so
far as to say that the Lawyer's assumption that it was Bartleby's "soul
that suffered" 70 indicates that he doubts whether Bartleby shares in what
theologians call "right reason." 71 There is no criticism of the law that
he now assumes Bartleby cannot comply with.
At the end of this highly charged incident, the Lawyer, who had
momentarily waxed poetic about their shared status as "sons of Adam," 72
and about their shared ontological condition, resolves to set up a situation
that will allow him to dismiss Bartleby. He plans to "put certain calm
questions" to Bartleby that he is sure the scrivener "would prefer not
to" answer.73 His calling them "calm questions" indicates that the Lawyer
believes them to be within the sphere of information 'reasonably' allowed
to an employer. If Bartleby refuses to answer these questions he will
be in breach of contract. The Lawyer will then be in a position to either
dismiss him or bring legal action to force him to fulfill his promise.
Thus, if anything, the experience of this dialectical tension results in
a hardening of the Lawyer's position. For now, instead of granting
66 Ibid at 121.
67 Ibid
68 Ibid
69 Ibid at 122.
70 Ibid
71 For a discussion of 'right reason' in American religious thought, see Perry Miller, The New
England Ming The Seventeenth Century, vol. I (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1939)
111-206.
72 See Melville, supra, note I at 120.
73 Ibid at 122.
19861
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
"privileges and unheard of exemptions," 74 he plans to dismiss Bartleby
for refusing to "do his duty."75 To all accounts then, the Lawyer has
not changed his belief that, as a contracted worker, the purpose of
Bartleby's existence is to satisfy those desires voiced by his contractor.
The second statement that allows us to determine whether this
incident marks a significant change in the Lawyer's Weltanschauung is
uttered by the narrative voice recounting these events. This voice is, as
we are told at the beginning of the story, the Lawyer in his old age,
years after the events have taken place. Were the dialectic to have changed
the Lawyer, as Schwartz suggests, then it is probable that the raison
d'etre of this voice would be to demonstrate how he is different from
his earlier self. This would have been an excellent place to mark such
a difference. However, in the midst of his reveries and immediately after
the suggestive statement, "Ah, happiness courts the light, so we deem
the world is gay, but misery hides aloof, so we deem misery there is
none," we read, "These sad fancyings - chimeras doubtless, of a sick
and silly brain - led on to other and more special thoughts." 76
From the narrator's later point of view, then, the images of unity,
"fraternal melancholy" and, indeed, the tragic observation that some men
live in "gloom," are "chimeras," or products of sickness. The narrator
leaves little doubt as to what he now thinks of these ideas. For, in calling
the brain that imagined them "silly," he implies much more than the
notion of funny. Rather, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, in
Melville's era, "silly" implied senseless and had to do with people who
were "weak and deficient in intellect" such as the "feeble minded." Hence,
the narrator believes that his earlier reveries lacked the hallmarks of
'reasonable' thought While it is true that the "brain" he refers to is
his own, it is imperative to the narrating Lawyer's later consciousness
that he be able to categorize his own earlier thoughts in such a way
as to ensure that they have no lasting effect on his own status as a
'reasonable' man. By placing these observations inside the paragraph
that contains the most suggestive notions, the narrator emphasizes the
distance between his own former 'silliness' and his later 'reasoned'
judgment of it.77
Unable to get Bartleby to adhere to a pre-determined contractual
model, the Lawyer gives up and decides to do his business elsewhere.
74 Ibid at 118.
75 Ibid at 114.
76 Ibid at 120.
77 Later, I will show, via an analysis of the Lawyer's retrospective prologue, that the narrating
consciousness is not the least bit different from the man who adheres to the principles and assumptions
of common law in the sections of the story we are now considering.
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There is no indication that at the end of this dialectic the Lawyer is
any less convinced that John Jacob Astor and common law methods
"ring like unto bullion."78 This section of the story ends with the Lawyer
admitting that he bowed to the common sense of his friends who had
commented on the "strange creature" that kept "deny[ing] his authority,"79
and his obvious relief that the men he "engage[d]" to move him fulfilled
their 'day-labour' contract in a stereotyped manner.80
The next most often-cited evidence that his encounter with Bartleby
has transformed the Lawyer is his desperate offer to take Bartleby home
with him. Marx calls this offer "truly charitable" 81 and thus contrasts
it with the Lawyer's own earlier view that "charity" toward Bartleby
was a way to "cheaply purchase a delicious self-approval" which "will
eventually prove a sweet morsel for my conscience." 82 The Lawyer's
offer reads: "Bartleby ... will you go home with me now - not to
my office, but my dwelling - and remain there till we conclude upon
some arrangement for you at our leisure?" 83 While the Lawyer offers
Bartleby a place to stay, the real question is for what purpose? There
is nothing to suggest that the phrase "conclude upon some arrangement"
means anything but finding a job that Bartleby would "willingly" assent
to perform. Accordingly, the Lawyer does not suggest that he has been
impressed by Bartleby's assertion (albeit, an assertion via negation), that
Bartleby is entitled to exercise his own will and not work and that he
has the right not to bow to the wishes of the man of property. The
Lawyer's invocation of contractual human relations indicates that he
rejects the notion that Bartleby can exist outside of "arrangements" as
he understands them. The Lawyer's attitude towards Bartleby's (in)action
and the understated statement is still committed to the notion that the
only proper way for an individual to behave is to conform to the limits
and assumptions of contract law. Indeed, one might go so far as to say
that even now the Lawyer can simply not understand how anyone could
(want to) exist outside the settled order supplied by contract law.
The Lawyer has not undergone even the beginning of a transformation
because he does not doubt the legitimacy of the 'ontological reduction'
of the worker. Given the severity of that reduction, proof of the Lawyer's
change would be his viewing Bartleby as having a 'reason' equal to his
78 See Melville, supra, note 1 at 104.
79 Ibid at 131.
80 Ibid at 133.
81 See Marx, supra, note 6 at 96. It should be noted that Schwartz (supra, note 2 at 462)
realizes that the Lawyer's offer is not as pure as Marx would have us believe.
82 See Melville, supra, note I at 115.
83 Ibid at 136.
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own. Does the Lawyer now believe that Bartleby is capable of deciding
his future on his own terms? The answer, of course, is no. Indeed, he
specifies that his offer is dependant upon Bartleby agreeing that his future
is subject to joint control. As we know the axis on which the Lawyer's
ideology turns, we can assume that he will do all he can to get Bartleby
to accept once again the reduction of his person by contract law. In
short, he wants Bartleby to return to being little more than an "old chair"84
that can be used by whoever owns it.
There is another way of looking at this incident. Instead of arguing
that the Lawyer wants to help Bartleby return to a contractual relationship,
it can be argued that he now has concluded that Bartleby is totally
incapable of functioning within this legal regime. However, if the Lawyer
does have any doubt about the applicability of contract law to Bartleby,
he still does not question the epistemological and ontological assumptions
of the law itself. He immediately invokes a different model of social
organization, namely apprenticeship, with which to control Bartleby. In
this system, with which the Lawyer would have been acquainted both
from his study of Blackstone's Commentaries and the rules that governed
his relationship to Ginger Nut, the assumption is that an apprentice does
not have a 'rational' or independent 'will'.
In contrast to contract law, the apprenticeship system viewed the
labourer as a perpetual minor to be cared for and told what to do. The
apprentice did not have the fungible property with which to express a
unique 'will' in the marketplace. In the 'great chain of being', which
had defined apprenticeship from its medieval beginnings, the "master
stood in loco parentis" and as such was entrusted with "moral indoc-
trination, Christian training and instruction in literacy" and, more im-
portantly, the power to decide all issues that pertained to the apprentices.85
To argue that the Lawyer is reaching a more humane way of dealing
with Bartleby is absurd. It is true that compared to the freedom from
liability that Justice Shaw's creation of the "fellow servant" rule granted
industrial employers, apprenticeship and its "master-servant" rule did
offer a modicum of protection to the injured or aged worker.86 Nonetheless,
in the latter system; the worker was at the bottom of the social hierarchy.
Where contract law posited a fleeting moment of ontological equality
if only for the purpose of contract formation, in the apprenticeship system,
labourers were ipso facto subordinated to their masters. In both readings,
then, far from moving closer to an understanding of Bartleby's claim.
84 Ibid at 130.
85 See Horwitz, supra, note 21 at 208.
86 See Friedman and Ladinsky, supra, note 21 at 269.
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to independence, the Lawyer remains faithful to the categories furnished
by the history of common law and philosophical rationalism.
III. THE PRUDENCE OF PRISON YARDS AND SEQUELS
Although it has become traditional to link the scene in the prison
yard and the sequel, it is important to separate the two. For, as the
Lawyer himself points out, the events he recounts in the sequel occurred
"a few months after the scrivener's decease."87 Accordingly, the scene
in the grassy part of New York's Tombs will be discussed first, followed
by an examination of whether the sequel indicates that the Lawyer's
deals with Bartleby here had any substantial effect on him.
Marx and Schwartz claim that one of the ways we can tell that
the Lawyer has changed is that he perceives the "green grass" 88 of the
prison yard in the same way that they understand Melville's version of
the "pastoral." They argue that the Lawyer is affected by the profound
tension that exists between the promise of the "leaves of grass"89 and
the proof of man's fall, as symbolized by the criminal voyeurs and the
presence of death. He experiences, according to Marx and Schwartz,
a "final revelation" 90 that carries him beyond the limits of common law,
and thus beyond the classical liberal definitions of status, duty, and order.
According to Schwartz, Bartleby makes those around him realize
that, propertied or not, each human consciousness is ultimately alone
with the knowledge that "it will cease to be."91 The only real bond between
people,then, is the "charity" with which they help others "meet the
challenge of death."92 Clearly, this "charity" cannot be a variant of the
rational calculus referred to earlier. Instead, it must be a "genuine and
humane concern for other people,"93 an unrestrained giving of oneself
a la Ishmael and Queequeg.94 If this is true, what we should now find
is a Lawyer who wants to efface the institutional differences between
87 See Melville, supra, note 1 at 140.
88 See Marx, supra, note 6 at 104; see also L. Marx, The Machine in the Garden" Technology
and The Pastoral Ideal in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964); see Schwartz, supra,
note 2 at 462.
89 Ibid at 104.
90 Ibid
91 See Schwartz, supra, note 2 at 457.
92 See Marx, supra, note 6 at 104.
93 See Schwartz, supra, note 2 at 455.
94 For a full discussion of the relationship between Ishmael and Queequeg see R.K. Martin,
Hero, Captain and Stranger Male Friendshi, Social Critique and Literary Form in the Sea Novels
of Herman Melville (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986) at 77-81.
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himself and his former employee. We should also find that classical
liberalism is no longer the touchstone of his thought.
Rather than undertake a full critique of Schwartz and Marx, this
Part will focus on the Lawyer's behaviour in this supposedly "magical"
setting9 5 of the prison yard. If there is a moment when the Lawyer
experiences anything like "deeply felt and spontaneous sympathy,"96 it
is when he sees the fulfillment of his earlier vision of Bartleby's enrobed
corpse: "Something prompted me to touch him. I felt his hand, when
a tingling shiver ran up my arm and down my spine to my feet."97 This
is the first time the Lawyer has referred to any type of human physical
contact between men, and thus it might be seen as the moment when
certain barriers are broken down.98 However, the few statements that
follow it are not that different. It is worth noting that in the "Dollars
Damn Me" letter, which opens Marx's article, Melville himself warns
against the "mischief' that follows when men forget that the "all feeling"
of a summer's day on a hillside is only a "temporary feeling or opinion,"
and not the stuff of "universal application." 99 Accordingly, while the
Lawyer might realize that, despite all his property, he too is human,
the real question is whether he proceeds to make a link between what
might be called eschatological democracy and a more equitable social
order.
Nowhere in the remainder of the story does the Lawyer denounce
the social system that brought Bartleby to his death. Nor is there an
expansive movement that characterized the Lawyer's "special thoughts"''oo
when he discovered Bartleby's horrible solitude. In contrast to the critics
who, at this point in the story, begin to speculate on what it was that
drove Bartleby to assert his own desires, the Lawyer's answer to the
grubman's rhetorical questions "does he live without dining?" and "Eh! -
He's asleep, ain't he?"'0, will be the focus here.
Since the Lawyer's answer that Bartleby is now "[w]ith kings and
councelors"' 0 2 is a citation from Job (3:14), it might at first seem as
95 See Marx, supra, note 6 at 104.
96 Ibid
97 See Melville, supra, note 1 at 139.
98 For a discussion of how Melville uses physical-sexual contact between men as a way of
showing a new and less hierarchical social order, see Martin, supra, note 94.
99 The source of this letter of June 1851 is H. Melville, "Letter of June 1(?) 1851" in Leyda,
ed., The Portable Melville, (New York: Viking Press, 1952) at 434.
100 See Melville, supra, note 1 at 120.
101 Ibid. at 139.
102 Ibid at 140.
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though the Lawyer has finally undergone some kind of transformation.103
However, far from being a sign that he has reached some "kind of
awareness of human misery," this phrase indicates that his conceptual
universe is still bounded by the institutions of legal science. He does
not critique the contractual assumptions that are realized most clearly
in the image of the money-grubbing grubman. The argument for this
position would be that since in the end, there is an eschatological
democracy where kings, counsellors, and scriveners are all equal, any
social system that allows the illusion of ontological inequality is necessarily
at variance with the truth. However, had the Lawyer wanted us to assume
that he was at variance with the grubman, he would have indicated it
by adding something more than "murmured I"104 after his half-hearted
quotation.
In place of the kind of logic implying a critique of American society,
the Lawyer uses the teleological aspects of theological thought to validate
the existing social system. Rather than indicating that there are certain
identifiable causes for human misery, the Lawyer's emphasis on the
ultimate equality of death suggests that inequality is only transient. By
focusing on the ultimate equality of death, the Lawyer indicates that
he is well within the precepts of what can be called the American 'spirit
of capitalism', which preached that in the next life, both the rich and
poor will be equal.10S Thus, the story proper ends with the Lawyer showing
us that not even the "tingling shiver" he experienced after touching
Bartleby's lifeless hand was enough to alter his belief in the systems
of thought devised by sovereigns and their legal lackeys.
Unlike the sequels to "Benito Cereno" 106 and Billy Budd,107 the
"Bartleby" sequel is narrated by the same consciousness that reports
the story proper. This is an important difference because it means that
in this case the sequel cannot have the role that critics ascribe to the
other two.108 The other sequels are cast as official versions of the events
narrated in the stories, showing that far from being the unadorned 'truth',
the products of legal reason are self-serving and biased presentations
of a specific and limited point of view.10 9 By contrasting in quick succession
what he called an "inside narrative" of the stories proper with the official
103 See Stein, supra, note 11 at 108.
104 See Melville, supra, note 1 at 140.
105 M. Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. by Talcott Parsons
(New York: Scribner, 1958).
106 See Melville, supra, note 1 at 141.
107 Ibid at 7.
108 See Thomas, supra, note 17.
109 Ibid
1986]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
and legalistic sequels, Melville shows just how the legal mind's monologia
distorts the actions of human beings.110
Although the "Bartleby" sequel is technically different from that
of "Benito Cereno" and Billy Budd, this does not mean that it has nothing
to say about the legal mind. Quite the contrary. Here Melville focuses
on another aspect of this mind, the hubris at the root of legal reason
and its unchanging belief in its own 'assumptions'. The voice that speaks
the sequel is the same one that has resisted the dialectical effect of
Bartleby's presence all along. This Lawyer continues to believe that truth
can only be gleaned by applying the methods sanctified by the common
law.
This examination of the sequel begins with a discussion of the
Lawyer's attitude toward the "vague report" that reaches him a few
months after the prison yard scene."' If the famous exclamation that
ends the story is to be taken, as Schwartz and Marx argue it should,
as proof that the Lawyer has acquired a "sympathy" with those who
"despair" for the human condition, we should find that the Lawyer has
abandoned the Black Letter rules of legal method because they are unequal
to the reality of ontological ambiguity." 2
At first it appears as though the Lawyer has been transformed. Not
only does he draw our attention to the fact that he cannot vouch for
the rumour's veracity and that he finds that it has "a certain suggestive
interest," but he also tells us that he was seized with inexpressible emotions
when he heard that "Bartleby had been a subordinate clerk in the Dead
Letter Office at Washington, from which he had been suddenly removed
by a change in the administration."" However, while the Lawyer might
sound different, there are signs that just below the surface all is the
same. For example, the Lawyer's warning to "the reader" that he could
''never ascertain" just "how true" the rumour is does not stem from
any great ontological insight."14
The Lawyer is unsure of the rumour's 'truth' because it remains
uncorroborated. That is, it does not meet the common law standard of
reliable evidence that would solve all problems for a Master in Chancery.
Rather than raise vexing questions for the Lawyer, it supplies an answer
for the problem of understanding Bartleby, an answer that confirms the
Lawyer's interpretation of the evidence he had of Bartleby's behaviour.
l10 See Melville, supra, note I at 7.
11 Ibid at 140.
112 See Schwartz, supra, note 2 at 469-72.
113 See Melville, supra, note I at 140.
"14 Ibid
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The Lawyer still thinks in a manner consistent with the common
law's 'artificial reason'. As in other incidents, there is a brief moment
when it appears that the rumour might cause an important change. Indeed,
the line "Dead letters! does it not sound like dead men?""'5 recalls the
earlier links made by his "sick and silly brain." 1 6 However, as with
the other moments of the dialectic, the Lawyer never takes the next
step. He does not criticize the social order that reduces men to the status
of spent letters.
Rather than using this rumour to critique the system and his own
role in reducing all human things to ciphers and letters on "bonds, and
mortgages, and title deeds," 117 the Lawyer uses it to quarantine Bartleby
and thereby exonerate both himself and society. In the same way that
the 'artificial reason' of common law posits certain 'legal fictions' in
order to remain internally coherent, the Lawyer builds an interpretation
that is consistent with the assumptions he has found it proper to make
about Bartleby.118 When they first met the Lawyer assumed Bartleby
to be 'rational'. Now he assumes that the scrivener is incapable of behaving
in accordance with the 'common sense' of Americans. He now considers
Bartleby to be so far outside the boundaries of 'common sense' that
his fate is unconnected to the social order.
The Lawyer describes Bartleby: "Conceive a man by nature and
misfortune prone to a pallid hopelessness."'" 9 In his mind, Bartleby is
"by nature" outside of the hopefulness of American society and thus
outside the bounds of 'reason'. Since American society is ordered by
the 'reason' of common law, Bartleby, cannot fit into it. Most importantly,
Bartleby's difference is not the fault of either society or the liberal definition
of 'reason'. He is a freak of 'nature' and as such is completely disconnected
from the ways, means, and ends of society. At the beginning of the story
the elderly Lawyer assures us that Bartleby was the "strangest" scrivener
he "ever saw or heard of,"120 implying that his story is not to be taken
as a model for others.
Of course, it is not difficult to imagine how the Lawyer could use
Bartleby's story to critique the society produced by common law. The
point is, however, that even though he mentions it, it never crosses the
Lawyer's mind to link Bartleby's sad fate to the mysterious equality of
115 Ibid
116 Ibid at 120.
117 Ibid at 104.
118 For a discussion of the role of "legal fictions" in the structure of the common law, see
Boorstin, supra, note 22 at 98, 102, 133-35.
119 See Melville, supra, note I at 140.
120 Ibid at 103.
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"rotation in office."'121 One of the most interesting aspects of this 'fiction'
is that it allows the Lawyer to end any ambiguity that may remain vis-
&-vis Bartleby and his past. Where earlier the Lawyer was unable to
take possession of this aspect of his contracted worker (and thus was
denied one of his prerogatives), now he asserts his own 'will' over Bartleby's
memory. There is no room left for what Bartleby might have "preferred"
to be; like the contracted worker, he has become a symbol manipulated
by the Lawyer.
The end of the sequel reads:
The report was this: that Bartleby had been a subordinate clerk in the Dead Letter
Office at Washington, from which he had been removed by a: sudden change
in the administration. When I think over this rumor, hardly can I express the
emotions which seized me. Dead letters! does it not sound like dead men? Conceive
a man by nature and misfortune prone to pallid hopelessness, can any business
seem more fitted to heighten it than that of continually handling these dead letters,
and assorting them for the flame? For by the cartload they are annually burned.
Sometimes from out the folded paper the pale clerk takes a ring - the finger
it was meant for, perhaps, molders in the grave; a blank note sent in swiftest
charity - for whom it would relive nor eats nor hungers any more; pardon for
these who died despairing; hope for those who died unhoping; good tidings for
those who died stifled by unrelieved calamities. On errands of life, these letters
speed to death.
Ah, Bartleby! Ah, humanity!122
In the few sentences before the exclamation, the Lawyer does seem to
recognise the existence of human suffering. However, again the Lawyer
is careful to insulate the social order from any blame. In the same way
that he blithely accepts Bartleby's ill fortune at the hands of the 'spoils
system', the Lawyer's references to fingerless rings and hungerless corpses
are sufficiently abstract to suggest that these events have an ineluctable
pattern, which is balanced by the unrealized "charity" of others.123
Nowhere in the last few lines does the Lawyer seem conscious of the
fact that hunger and the need for bank notes are products of a specific
type of social system. Indeed, far from wanting to challenge the sadness
of this fate, the Lawyer follows the creed of American capitalists like
121 "Rotation in office" (also known as the "spoils system") was the name given to the practice
whereby a new President would dismiss as many civil servants (Le. Postal Inspectors, the Land
Office or Collectors of the Customs) as he could, so that he could then award patronage to his
supporters. This practice reached new heights under the Presidency of Andrew Jackson. For a
discussion of the ideological underpinnings of"rotation in office" and a description of why antebellum
Americans thought that it supplied a means to create some kind of equality in society, see William
E. Nelson, The Roots of American Bureaucracy, 1830-1900 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1982) at 1-40. A brief picture of how "rotation in office" worked can be found in the
"Customs House" sketch which precedes Nathaniel Hawthorne's The Scarlet Letter and Other Tales
of the Puritans, ed. by Harry Levin (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961) at 5.
122 See Melville, supra, note 1 at 140.
123 Ibid
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John Jacob Astor, who believed that suffering was a tragic reality of
the human condition in a fallen world, but that it had nothing at all
to do with the social systems. 124
Accordingly, we cannot read "Ah, Bartleby! Ah, humanity!" as an
indication that the Lawyer has, finally, undergone some great transfor-
mation. The fact that it comes at the end of the sequel is not enough
to override the evidence that the Lawyer remains true to the legal and
social assumptions of Coke, Blackstone, and, most importantly, Shaw.
There are several moments of dialectical tension, but after each crisis
the Lawyer reverts to well established modes of thought. In the period
of time in which he was in contact with Bartleby it might be argued
that the Lawyer has become somewhat more aware of the "misery"
that hides "aloof." 125 Nonetheless, the most important fact to come out
of an analysis of each incident is that the Lawyer remains committed
to the social order enshrined in common law.
IV. THE IDEOLOGY OF AN ELDERLY MAN
Neither Marx nor Schwartz investigate whether the 'transformation'
they argue for actually exists in the latest moments of the Lawyer's
consciousness to which we have access. However, they do not ignore
the retrospective prologue that opens the story. Rather, they read it as
though it sheds light only on that which is "indispensable to an adequate
understanding" 126 of Bartleby and tells us nothing about what the Lawyer
is like in his old age. Now, since the narrator of "Bartleby" is the same
person who has supposedly undergone the transformation, it is nevertheless
worth investigating what the narrating Lawyer is like long after the events
have had a chance to affect him.
Those who believe that the Lawyer has been changed might object
to any reconstruction of the story's chronology and prefer to pay attention
to the narrator's diegesis. They could try to argue that, as he did in
124 The classic statement of the link between Capitalism and theology is, of course, Weber's
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, supra, note 105. For a short discussion of how
with the aid of Herbert Spencer's philosophy of Social Darwinism, American Protestant theologians
"enthusiastically leaped to defend the spirit of business" and laissez faire see Ben B. Seligman,
Business and Businessmen in American History (New York: The Dial Press, 1971) at 207 and 200-
25. In his biography of John Jacob Astor, Kenneth W. Porter points out that while Astor gave
generously to some social aid organizations and lavishly to cultural causes (for example, the Astor,
Tidlen and Lennox Library in New York) he had the usual self-made man's contempt for those
in financial distress. Porter quotes from a biography written in the 1860s that Astor "held beggary
of all descriptions in strong contempt, and seemed to think that, in this country want and fault
are synonymous." Kenneth W. Porter, John Jacob Astor vol. 2 (New York. Russell and Russell,
1966) at 1087.
125 See Melville, supra, note I at 120.
126 Ibid at 104.
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Moby Dick, Melville has employed the literary convention of the 'forgetful
narrator' here. The 'forgetful narrator' is one who shows no signs of
those changes that, according to strict chronology, he or she has already
undergone. This kind of narrator is one who appears to have 'forgotten'
the result of the story being told. This narrative strategy allows the reader
to follow the path by which the narrator's consciousness is altered.
However, neither Marx nor Schwartz invoke this or any other
justification for omitting an analysis of what the Lawyer of the prologue
is like. It cannot be convincingly argued that the "rather elderly man"'2 7
who narrates this story is a 'forgetful narrator'. Not only is he careful
to show us that he knows his past, but more importantly, he believes
he is master of its interpretation. Further, the sequence when the narrator's
voice breaks in to speak of a "sick and silly brain" (previously discussed)
shows that the narrator is at one with the Lawyer who judged Bartleby
so harshly. At the latest stage of his life - when most men in his position
have looked back and found their career and actions wanting - this
most anonymous member of this powerful profession remains true to
the forms, conventions, and theoretical foundations of the elegant science
of common law.
For heuristic purposes only, this discussion of the prologue is divided
into two parts. First, the Lawyer's attitude toward both his past and present
selves will be considered. Second, it will be shown that in his old age
the Lawyer still abides by the forms, conventions, and epistemological
foundations of common law.
The prologue is written from the point of view of an old man looking
back on his life. At no point does the Lawyer reprove his former self.
If anything, in the short biographical sketch that precedes his telling
of the "advent of Bartleby,"' 28 he views his life as an unbroken continuum.
Indeed, if any one event is given especial importance, it is his loss of
the office of Master in Chancery and not, as it should be if he has been
transformed, his implication in the pitiful life and death of Bartleby.
In describing his beliefs before he met Bartleby, the narrating Lawyer
moves effortlessly between his past and present, and at no point indicates
that now his beliefs are different than they were then. "I am a man,"
he writes, "who, from his youth upwards, has been filled with a profound
conviction that the easiest way of life is the best."129 His use of the
present perfect tense - "has been filled" - indicates that now in his
old age he continues to avoid the more energetic aspects of lawyering.
127 Ibid at 103.
128 Ibid at 105.
129 Ibid at 104.
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Instead of allowing anything "to invade [his] peace," the narrator tells
us that "I am one of those unambitious lawyers who ... do a snug business
among rich men's bonds, mortgages, and title deeds."'130 Since he does
not say that this was the kind of "business" that at one time he did,
it is clear that this is the kind of "business" he has continued to do.
There is no indication that the experience of dealing with Bartleby has
changed the Lawyer's mind about anything. He continues to believe that
lawyers like himself should find their values in "bonds, mortgages, and
title deeds."
The following reveals the way the narrating Lawyer wants to be
thought of, as well as what he has always felt about one of the high
priests of American capitalism:
All who know me consider me an eminently safe man. The late John Jacob Astor
... had no hesitation in pronouncing my first grand point to be prudence, my
next, method. I do no speak it in vanity, but simply record the fact that I was
not unemployed in my profession by the late John Jacob Astor, a name which,
I admit, I love to repeat, for it hath a rounded and orbicular sound to it, and
rings like unto bullion.' 3'
The narrator takes great pride in his- past relationship to John Jacob
Astor. It is clear from his reference to the music he hears when he recites
Astor's full name that the narrating Lawyer has no quarrel with the
forms and definitions of value embodied by he whose very name "rings
like unto bullion." Were he a reformed man, we might expect to hear
something about the music of the spheres; instead, he listens for tinkling
silver. The fact that he does not take issue with the way that other
professionals view both his present and past behaviour indicates that,
far from forgetting this past, he is fully conscious of it; and he has a
different understanding of his life than do Marx and Schwartz. There
is no radical disjuncture between the pre- and post-Bartleby periods of
his life.
If Schwartz and Marx are correct about what happens to the Lawyer,
then it seems plausible that in this retrospective prologue one should
find some sign that he has rejected (or at least questioned) the ideology
which formed his former self and the story he is about to tell. In place
of the certainty the man of legal method would claim to be his and
the assumptions embodied in the Black Letter rules of law as to what
'truth' is, we should find, if not a total sceptic, at least a man who
appreciates that human existence cannot be reduced to marks on a ledger.
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to use the techniques of literary discourse to expose the tragic error
perpetuated by the methods of legal reason. However, the narrator
continues to believe in the categories of legal reason and also believes
in the theoretical foundations of common law.
Although he hides it beneath a genial matter-of-factness, the narrating
Lawyer reveals several striking aspects about the way he thinks. For
example, he states, "While of other law-copyists I might write the complete
life, of Bartleby nothing of the sort can be done. I believe no materials
exist for a full and satisfactory biography of this man. It is an irreparable
loss to literature" (emphasis mine).' 32 The observation that Bartleby's life
failed to produce the usual "materials" that allow biographers to write
"full and satisfactory" volumes indicates that the Lawyer still believes
in both the value of what we can call positive evidence, and the possibility
of an author creating a 'total' and authoritative picture of another
individual. This is a far cry from the epistemological doubt that is supposed
to exist in Schwartz's and Marx's conception of the reformed legal
thinker133
While he does not specify what "materials" Bartleby did not leave
behind, we can infer that the Lawyer refers to the usual assortment of
licences, bank records, contracts, and title deeds that not only indicate
a person's place in the social hierarchy, but that also, after the individual
has gone to the grave, allow Masters in Chancery to determine an
individual's ultimate value. The measure of acceptable evidence is, then,
not the traces or signs of a person's existence; rather, it is the formal
indicia of a person's position in the legal and social hierarchy. The
importance of this second type of evidence is that it allows both the
Master in Chancery and the biographer to produce "the" (not 'a')
"complete life" of another. While the Lawyer is aware that Bartleby
had existed without leaving behind any of the usual "materials," he does
not use this fact as a critical tool to illuminate the limits of the common
law's notion of positive evidence.
Having told us that he does not have recourse to the usual "materials,"
the narrating Lawyer immediately adds that he alone is the source of
all knowledge about Bartleby. However, it should not be assumed that
the Lawyer's emphasis on his own 'self as the source of 'truth' is in
any way related to the conception of the 'self held by the Romantics
132 Ibid at 103.
133 See Schwartz, supra, note 2 at 469, 471. See Marx, supra, note 6 at 102-05.
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or their American Transcendentalist cousins.134 Instead of aligning himself
with those who saw the 'self' as a subversive concept, standing in opposition
to a normative structure of society, this Lawyer is at pains to show that
his reactions are formed, defined, and at all times in accord with common-
law expectations. He states, "What my own astonished eyes saw of
Bartleby, that is all I know of him."'13 For the Lawyer, "astonishment"
is not the beginning of a different mode of thought. Each time Bartleby
"prefer[red] not to" he was surprised, because he had expected the
"penniless wight ' 136 to behave in a predictable manner. The experience
of "astonishment" does not signal a change in the Lawyer's structure
of expectations. The word "astonishment" is not a sign that a norm is
absent; on the contrary, it indicates that a norm is present.
Having raised the issue of his own incorrect expectations, the Lawyer
makes no effort to use this knowledge to critique the assumptions which
have been shown to be inadequate. In short, he makes no effort to distance
himself from his earlier style of thought. Indeed, the use of the word
"that" carries his past attitude into his present, proving that the opposite
is the case. In the end, the fact that Bartleby causes the Lawyer to
experience something out of the ordinary is further proof that first it
is Bartleby who is "strange" (and thereby his fate is not a sign of a
general problem) and second, the Lawyer has the ability to isolate and
thereby naturalize those experiences that could lead less conventional
thinkers to subversive questions.
The most important indication that the narrating Lawyer remains
true to the epistemological assumptions lying at the heart of common
law thought is his conception of "literature." This concept is evidenced
by his vehement denouncement of Lord Byron. His negative judgment
of Byron has nothing to do with whether or not he liked Byron's works 37
134 The Transcendalists have often been referred to as the American Romantics. Influenced
by both the British Romantics (Le William Wordsworth and Thomas Carlyle), Ralph Waldo Emerson,
Henry David Thoreau, William Ellery Channing and Margaret Fuller (to name only four), rejected
the Neoclassical definition of literary order and, as Ferguson has shown, its conception of public
and social order. Besides believing in the efficacy of reason, Neoclassicism emphasized fixed standards
and hierarchical social and aesthetic orders. Further, it conceived of nature as a harmonious whole
which supplied the model for both aesthetic decorum and an ordered society. In contrast, American
Romantics emphasized the subjective imagination, originality, fluid emotionalism, spontaneity, and
perhaps most of all, a belief in the rejuvinative power of experiencing nature.
For a discussion of the major differences between Romanticism and Neoclassicism see: Walter
Bate, From Classic to Romantic: Premises of Taste in Eighteenth Centuy England (New York: Harper
and Row, rpt., 1961). See also Ferguson, supra, note 46; Julie Ellison, Emerson's Romantic Style
(Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1984).
135 See Melville, supra, note 1 at 131.
136 Ibid. at 117.
137 Lord Byron, The Works of Lord Byron. A New, Revised and Enlarged Edition, with Illustrations,
ed. Ernest Hartley Coleridge (London: John Muarry, 1898) 13 Volumes. For a short discussion
of Byron's work and his activities during the Greek Revolution, see Paul G. Trueblood, Lord Byron
(New York: Twayne Publishers, 1977).
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or even the poet's activities in Greece. The problem with this "mettlesome
poet" 38 is, rather, that he expresses a view of the individual that has
no place for the notion that people should willingly subject themselves
to the discipline of "dull, wearisome, and lethargic affair[s]."' 39 The
Lawyer sees Byron as representing all those who have a conception of
reality and value opposite to that of the common law.140
The narrator's attitude toward the Romantic conception of the
individual's value and imagination, a concept opposed to that of a
structured and organized society, is similar to that when he judged his
own musings on "fraternal melancholy" to be "mere chimeras of a sick
and silly mind." 141 For, to accept the implications of his own imagination
or the arguments of the Romantics means that the Lawyer must accept
that, organized as it is, society crushes the most important aspect of
human beings. He would then have to adopt a standard of values that
does not give pride of place to contractual exchange and predictable
completion of assigned labour. He would see that, for the masses, the
social system that is supported and defined by the elegant science he
practices is little short of an agony.
The narrating Lawyer's knowledge of Romanticism and his vehement
rejection of it are not surprising. Although he is not affected by Bartleby
and never questions the legal fictions of common law, he is not an ignorant
man. Indeed, as both Perry Miller and Robert Ferguson have shown,
antebellum lawyers were keenly aware of the dangers posed by the
Romantic Movement. 42 No less a person than Justice Story saw it as
"threaten[ing] the very foundations of the intellectual edifice he and his
fellows had patiently constructed," "fellows" like Blackstone and his
followers on both sides of the Atlantic. 43
The intellectual edifice of common law was constructed largely out
of the epistemology of eighteenth-century Neoclassical aesthetics. 44 As
Boorstin has shown, Blackstone transformed the notion that there was
a hierarchy of genres, where each type is isomorphically related to a
particular subject, into a justification of the social hierarchy, and he
138 See Melville, supra, note I at 111.
139 Ibid at Ill.
140 For a discussion of Romanticism's threat to the common lawyer's Neoclassical conception
of both his own social role and the structure of society, see Ferguson, supra, note 46 at 75-76,
248-57 and passim.
141 Ibid at 120.
142 p. Miller, The Life of the Mind in America, from the Revolution to the Civil War (New
York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1965).
143 Ibid at 146.
144 For a discussion of the American common lawyer's debt to Neoclassicism, see Ferguson,
supra, note 46 passim.
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adopted the aesthetic notions of decorum and balance to forestall any
questioning of the existing order.145 In the same way that literary forms
must ultimately show that all is as it should be in the most balanced
possible "Kingdoms," what Boorstin calls Blackstone's "mysterious
science"'146 was dedicated to showing that every law of England is as
it should be.
That the narrating Lawyer is faithful to this Neoclassical constellation
is easily demonstrated. First, although we are told nothing of his training,
it would have been based on either Blackstone's work or that of his
American followers. Second, American intellectuals also looked upon
Neoclassicism as a way to cull the best from the classical democracies.1 47
The Lawyer's attitude toward his "bust of Cicero"148 indicates that even
if he did not want to follow in the tradition of Ciceronian eloquence,
he had probably heard Rufus Choate's admonition to "soak your mind
with Cicero."'149 As telling as these indications of the Lawyer's Neoc-
lassicism are, it is more important to see that his own actions and beliefs
are in accord with Neoclassical assumptions that were so dear to the
intellectual giants of the common law.
The Lawyer uses the word "literature" in the quotation cited above 50
in anything but an innocent manner. It is not a catch-all term for letters
or professional writing. Rather, it is defined in the previous sentence
by the phrase "a full and satisfactory biography." As we have seen, this
phrase contains certain assumptions as to what the purpose of written
discourse is. Since the only kind of evidence that has any value is that
indicating the subject's place in the social hierarchy, we can assume
that the purpose of "literature" is to explicate, explain, and, like Black-
stone's science, mystify the logic by which the individual lives in society.
Thus, "literature" has less to do with the imagination than it does with
justifying the status quo. For the Lawyer, "literature" is simply another
set of discursive practices that allow the authorities to indicate precisely
what is important to know about other social actors. The fact that he
never tries to speculate on Bartleby's attitude toward the contractual
system shows that the Lawyer believes that "literature" is of a piece
with mortgages, bonds, and title deeds.
145 See Boorstin, supra, note 22 at 84-105.
146 Ibid at title.
147 See Ferguson, supra, note 46 at passim.
148 See Melville, supra, note 1 at 112.
149 See Ferguson, supra, note 46 at 75.
150 See Melville, supra, note 118 and accompanying text.
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That the narrating Lawyer is true to the Neoclassical notions of
order, decorum, and hierarchy can also be seen in the complex way
he speaks of the loss of his "pleasantly remunative" office: "I seldom
lose my temper, much more seldom indulge in dangerous indignations
at wrongs and outrages, but I must be permitted to be rash here and
declare that I consider the sudden and violent abrogation of the office
of Master in Chancery by the new Constitution, as a - premature
act."' 5' The Lawyer adopts this apologetic tone because he knows that
while he might be able to use his pecuniary loss to justify his attitude,
by putting even his own economic self-interest before his fidelity to
decorum, he runs the risk of duplicating certain aspects of Romanticism's
emphasis on the 'self. To complain too loudly about the system takes
one some distance from it. Hence, the notion that the economic 'self
has a value independent of the mysterious workings of the law is dangerous,
since it shows that the individual need not accord with the heart and
soul of the order that is the common law. Although he has given himself
momentary leave to be indignant, the Lawyer is still decorous enough
to avoid penning a strong adjective to describe the "_ premature
act."
While he obviously disagrees with the abolition of his sinecure, the
Lawyer does not attack the legal system that extinguished it. He holds
up the decision to abolish the post as an example of indecorous, if not
unbalanced, reasoning on the part of the Constitution makers. Their actions
were "sudden and violent," and therefore not in conformity with the
Blackstonian notion of the slow evolution of legal genres. Further, the
loss was "premature," and hence a threat to the established hierarchy
if not to common sense reason itself. Finally, after voicing these complaints
showing that he has measured the legal system with its own cubit and
found it wanting, the Lawyer dismisses his observation as "by the way,"' 52
indicating that he does not want to draw too much attention to the problems
of legal reason and social structures.
I began this discussion of the retrospective prologue by observing
that those critics who argue that there has been a great transformation
in this man do not look at his latest consciousness. Having examined
his judgments about himself and his past, his attitude towards evidence
and his continued fidelity to the Neoclassical concepts that defined the
unreformed legal rhetoric of his day, we can say that at no point in
his old age does he appear to have broken from the "forms and
151 See Melville, supra, note 1 at 104.
152 Ibid
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conventions" that defined the pre-Bartleby period of his life. In the final
moments to which we have access, he is what he always was: a man
"not insensible to the late John Jacob Astor's good opinion."'' 3
V. CONCLUSION
Following Marx, Schwartz's discussion of this attorney concludes
with the assertion that after seeing his former employee on the "natural
grass" of the prison yard, the "lawyer begins to treasure life now that
he realizes what an ephermal gift it is."154 Extrapolating from what he
sees as the Lawyer's "deepened sympathy and appreciation of the despair
of his fellow human beings," Schwartz asserts that change in legal actors
is possible. 5 5 True, a reformed legal mind could never deal with what
he calls the more "metaphysic[all" questions raised by the law: "Is the
person now in jail for a crime committed half a lifetime ago enough
of the same person that we can justify his or her continued incarcer-
ation?" 56 However, within the limits of the "middle kingdom" and its
"forms and conventions," change can occur. He states that "there are
many ways in which legal officials can recognize the humanity of the
people they deal with."'157 Not only can lawyers "be more sensitive to
what clients really want to do, rather than what lawyers want them to
do," but also "[w]here appropriate, prosecutors can drop charges or lessen
the penalties they demand."' 58 Finally, he suggests that "judges can be
merciful in their sentencing."1 59
While one can applaud the 'humanism' behind Schwartz's hopes,
it should not go unnoticed that his suggestions leave both the structure
and the assumptions of the common law untouched. What assurance
is there that a client's intentions are any less inhumane than a lawyer's?
Had the Lawyer in "Bartleby" hired one of his colleagues to sue Bartleby
with all the vigour that our narrator could never muster could it be said
that the common law had become infused with a new humanity? What
Schwartz would (correctly) dub 'inhumanity' is a function of the phi-
losophical and social assumptions of common and contract law, assump-
tions that define and control what legal actors are and can "really want
to do."
153 Ibid
154 See Schwartz, supra, note 2 at 462.
155 Ibid at 462.
156 Ibid at 471.
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As we have already observed, Schwartz embarked on his "med-
itation" on "Bartleby" to present a picture of a reformed or, at least,
reformable lawyer. This was an unfortunate choice. Far from attaining
any new insights, realizing that his and the common law's epistemology
is flawed, and discovering redemption in the heart of the prison yard,
Bartleby's Lawyer remains unchanged. Not even the memory of the events
(or, for that matter, his long lost youth) give rise to a "sentimental"
tear.160 There is no transformation or betterment of this Lawyer, as Marx
and Schwartz believe. Perhaps more importantly, there is no evidence
that the Lawyer would even understand what they are getting at. His
reaction to Schwartz's question about whether or not a prisoner remains
during the course of his or her incarceration the same person is
unimaginable. Far from repeating Schwartz's interesting argument that
the "intellectual resources of middle kingdom life are not up to the
questions that life in the middle kingdom raises,"'16 the Lawyer would
answer with an unequivocal "Yes." Given what one has seen about his
conception of evidence and biography, it simply would not occur to him
that a prisoner or anyone else could be defined differently than by the
written documents in possession of the authorities.
160 See Melville, supra, note 1 at 103.
161 See Schwartz, supra, note 2 at 471.
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